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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIXIE S. COX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MERVYN K. COX, 
Defendant and Cross Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT-CROSS APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action wherein Plaintiff-Appellant 
hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff, alleged mental cruelty 
and asked for custody of the four minor children, a rea-
sonable division of the property, child support, alimony 
and attorney fees. Defendant and Cross Appellant, herein-
after referred to as Defendant, filed a counterclaim for 
divorce on the grounds of cruelty and asked for custody of 
the children, that a trust be provided for the children in 
lieu of some other provision of support and that Plaintiff 
be awarded no alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the divorce to the Defendant 
Mervyn K. Cox, Cross Appellant. The court initially 
awarded custody of the four minor children to the Defend-
) 
, Case No. 
) 13242 
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ant but thereafter modified its decision and granted 
custody to Plaintiff Dixie S. Cox who was the original 
Appellant in this action. 
After changing its decision to grant custody of the 
children to Plaintiff, the court also ordered Defendant to 
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOL-
LARS ($500.00) per month as child support. It granted 
to Plaintiff a total cash payment in the nature of alimony 
and property settlement in the amount of $65,000.00, to 
be reduced by $5,000.00 if paid within six months, which 
was done. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and Cross Appellant seeks a reversal of 
the lower court's modified decision regarding child cus-
tody. Plaintiff and Appellant seeks a modification of the 
property division, child support payments and alimony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts in addition to those already 
contained in Defendant's first brief on file herein and in 
addition to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts relative to the 
property division appear pertinent to the matter before 
theCourt... : :: :-: 
On February 9, 1973, after having reviewed the evi-
dence and memoranda filed by respective counsel, the 
lower court awarded a cash amount of $65,000.00 to the 
Plaintiff to be reduced to $60,000.00 if paid within six 
months. The court further ordered Defendant to p^y 
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Plaintiff $1,000.00 per month beginning from the date 
of the order to assist her in moving from the state and 
establishing her home. (R. 114-115) 
Pursuant to the order of the court, Defendant subse-
quently paid during the six-month period which followed 
the court's ruling, the amount of $1,000.00 per month. 
Thereafter, in final compliance with the court order, 
Defendant paid the remaining $54,000.00 as a cash settle-
ment to Plaintiff which, together with the $6,000.00 al-
ready paid, satisfied the judgment and resulted in a reduc-
tion of the property settlement award from $65,000.00 to 
$60,000.00. Defendant delivered his personal check in 
the amount of $54,000.00 to Plaintiff on August 8, 1973, 
several days prior to the expiration of the six-month pe-
riod, and Plaintiff accepted Defendant's check at that 
time. 
When, on February 18, 1974, the court made an 
order to have the $54,000.00 check placed in escrow, the 
check had already been delivered to Plaintiff seven months 
previous. Plaintiff thereafter cashed the check in spite 
of the court order and in full satisfaction of the judgment. 
After having considered the evidence and proposed 
findings pertaining to property division submitted by 
respective counsel, the court in its memorandum decision 
dated December 14, 1973, further amplified and expound-
ed on its ruling of February 9,1973, for the express purpose 
and "to the end that any abuse of discretion be avoided or 
that any mistake or error with respect to the lump sum 
alimony award and property settlement" which had been 
3 
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previously "made by the court might be corrected, modi-
fied or amended'' and for the purpose of indicating to the 
parties the basis upon which the award and division was 
made. (R. 201) The court further found the net assets 
belonging to the parties and subject to division and dis-
tribution to be the sum of $209,743.00 which the court 
rounded to $210,000.00. 
In arriving at its total award of $69,500.00 (Mem. 
Dec. R. 203), the court utilized the recapitulation of assets 
submitted by Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff's valua-
tion of the properties totaled $290,120.00 (R. 266), while 
Defendant's recapitulation and valuation totaled $164,-
787.00, after deducting general debts and obligations owing 
by the Defendant in addition to those owing on the prop-
erties. Plaintiff's brief only makes reference to Plaintiff's 
recapitulation but fails to recognize the testimony and 
evidence adduced by Defendant. In addition the cross ex-
amination of Plaintiff's appraisal witness disclosed that his 
valuations of the properties under consideration were in-
flated and in some instances without adequate foundation 
or basis. (Tr. 188, 191, 193, 194, 201) The court also 
heard testimony regarding the remaining debts and obli-
gations owing on the properties, which the court ordered 
Defendant to assume, as well as testimony regarding De-
fendant's annual after-tax income and reduction in De-
fendant's practice due to the arrival of several new ortho-
dontists in the area, (R. 417-418, R. 353-359, Exs. D-3, 
D-4, D-5) The court had before it a statement of Defend-
ant's debts and commitments totaling $20,100.00 in addi-
tion to those debts and obligations relating to property. 
(R.261) 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
With regard to valuation of the properties, the court 
also had the benefit of the 1973 Utah State Tax Commis-
sion valuation of which the court took judicial notice dur-
ing its hearing on November 16, 1973. (R. 200, 241) The 
State Tax Commission valued the parties' interest in the 
properties as follows: The Bentley and Sullivan farm, 
$36,210.00; Syphus farm, $18,469.00; home, $63,297.00; 
Kolob property, $1,507.00; Pine Valley lot, $2,830.00; 
Kemp Korner property, $79,843.00; carwash, $7,328.00. 
(Based on a factor of 5 times the assessed valuation.) 
At the conclusion of its memorandum decision, the 
court referred to the figures it had used in arriving at its 
award: (R. 204) 
"They [the figures used} were and are an assist-
ance to the trial court in testing the award in fact 
made by the court and which decision the court is 
not persuaded or constrained to alter, amend or 
change in any respect. This includes the motion 
by the Plaintiff to award her an in-kind distribu-
tion consistent with the net value held by the 
parties in the Bentley and Sullivan farm. Under the 
facts of this case, the court is persuaded that the 
interests of the paries, including their present and 
future equanimity, dictates an immediate, clean 
and total division of interests and equities and a 
cauterization thereof by legal fiat." 
In addition to the foregoing facts regarding property 
division and alimony Defendant further supplements his 
statement with the following facts pertaining to custody. 
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's representation in her 
brief to the contrary, the record contains numerous refer-
ences which would indicate immoral conduct on her part 
in the presence of the children. Defendant refers the 
5 
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Court to pages 6, 7 and 8 of his first brief wherein this con-
duct is described. (Tr. 93, 94, 98-99, 101, 204, 291-296, 
315) Plaintiff admitted that the man with whom she 
associated was a married man at the time of their inti-
macies. (Tr. I l l ) This is the same man with whom Plain-
tiff kept company in the presence of her children on num-
erous occasions. 
The immoral conduct of Plaintiff and considerable 
time spent away from the home and children resulted in 
neglect of the children. (Tr. 65, 101, 110, 129, 282, 284, 
301, 313, 322, 336, 345, 346, 348, 393, 423) 
Plaintiff's ten-day absence from the children in June 
of 1972 was not by mutual agreement with Defendant. 
(Tr. 436) Defendant, to the contrary, tried to persuade 
Plaintiff to stay home with the children. Defendant was 
unaware that Plaintiff would be gone for a ten-day pe-
riod. (Tr. 436) 
Plaintiff's statement of facts makes reference to testi-
mony of Plaintiff's 15-year-old sister who claimed some 
impropriety on the part of Defendant toward her; how-
ever, Defendant denied having had any such contact with 
her. (Tr. 461) The only time Defendant ever danced with 
Plaintiff's sister was when Plaintiff was teaching dance to 
a man in the kitchen of the Cox home and her sister came 
into the living room and asked Defendant to dance with 
her. Nothing improper took place. (Tr. 461) On another 
occasion Plaintiff's sister kissed Defendant on the cheek 
at the dinner table in front of the family and thanked him 
for straightening her teeth. (Tr. 461) 
6 
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Plaintiff also makes reference to a former employee 
of Defendant and suggests that there may have been an 
improper relationship between Defendant and that em-
ployee; however, Plaintiff's own citations to the record 
clearly indicate that there is no substance to that sugges-
tion. (Tr. 438, 439, 451) 
In its oral ruling on February 9, 1973, the court 
found as follows: 
"Now, the court finds that in the course of the 
testimony Mrs. Cox, Dixie S. Cox, testified that as 
soon as this divorce was completed it was her in-
tention and desire to leave Washington County 
and to move to Boise, Idaho, for the purpose, as 
soon as legally possible, of marrying a man by the 
name of Hamilton. The court finds on the proof, 
without any specific finding of any gross im-
propriety, although in the judgment of this court 
the evidence may support and does support poor 
judgment in having Mr. Hamilton associated as 
close as he was, to say the least, but the court's 
concern about taking those children from Washing-
ton County in the immediate future and taking 
them to Boise, Idaho, and in a short period of time 
introduce them into a new home, Mrs. Cox having 
testified that she intended to marry this Mr. Hamil-
ton; and the court having further some concern as 
to the propriety and judgment of some of the ac-
tions that the court heard testimony on concerning 
Mr. Hamilton and the position that he placed the 
Plaintiff in, the court is going to order that until 
the month of August, 1973, that the Defendant and 
Counter-Claimant in this case have the care, custody 
and control of the minor children; the court find-
ing that to be in the best interest of those children 
until it makes a further determination as to the 
stability in your life and as to the fact situations 
with respect to your plans, Mrs. Cox." 
7 
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The matter of custody was not considered again until 
October 5, 1973, at which time the court awarded custody 
of the four minor children to the Plaintiff without hearing 
any testimony or making any statement or finding regard-
ing any change of circumstances on which to predicate 
awarding custody to the Plaintiff, particularly since the 
court had previously found that it was in the best interests 
of the children to award custody to their father. The court 
had also found that Plaintiff had manifested poor judg-
ment and impropriety and lack of stability in her life. 
Counsel for Defendant argued at that time before the 
court that there had been no change whatever in the nature 
or character of the family situation from that depicted to 
the court at the time it rendered is prior decision and that 
change of custody would be totally unwarranted and 
manifestly against the vital interests of the four small 
children. (Tr. 21) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS APPEAL FROM THE PROP-
ERTY SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE 
DIVORCE JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED BE-
CAUSE T H A T JUDGMENT HAS BEEN SAT-
ISFIED I N FULL AND PLAINTIFF HAS AC-
CEPTED THE BENEFITS THEREUNDER. 
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the 
effect that a party having recognized the validity of a 
judgment and decree of divorce rendered by the court in 
a divorce action by accepting the favorable provisions 
thereof, financial and/or marital, accruing to him there-
under, in the absence of fraud, is estopped from question-
,8 
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ing the validity of such judgment or decree from and after 
the acceptance of such benefit or benefits. Here follows 
a list of some of the relatively recent decisions representing 
a sampling from various jurisdictions where the general 
rule is followed: Sidebottom v. Sidebottom, 233 N.E.2d 
667 (1968); Bulpitt v. Bulpitt, 107 Cal.App.2d 550, 237 
P.2d 539 (1951); Peters v. Peters, 175 Kan. 422, 263 P.2d 
1019 (1953); Spratt v. Spratt, 140 Minn. 510, 166 N.W. 
769, appeal dismissed 140 Minn. 512, 167 N.W. 735 
(1918); Gerbig v. Gerbig, 60 Nev. 292, 108 P.2d 317 
(1940); Jackson v. Jackson, 248 Iowa 1365, 85 N.W.2d 
590 (1957); Mason v. Forrest, 332 S.W.2d 634 (1959); 
Larabee v. Larabee, 128 Neb. 560, 259 N.W. 520 (1935); 
Swallers v. Swallers, 89 Cal.App.2d 458, 201 P.2d 23 
(1948); Moffett v. Moffett, 142 Kan. 9, 45 P.2d 579 
(1935); Isenhart v. henhart, 207 Or. 365, 296 P.2d 927 
(1956); Clark v. Clark, 362 S.W.2d 655 (1962); Murray v. 
Murray, 38 Wash.2d 269, 229 P.2d 309 (1951); Potter v. 
Potter, 46 Wash.2d 526, 282 P.2d 1052 (1955). 
This Court has followed the general rule that where 
a judgment is voluntarily paid and accepted, the right 
to appeal is waived. In the case of Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 
2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973), the court held as follows: 
"We are in agreement with the general rule that if 
a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, 
and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has be-
come moot and the right to appeal is waived. This 
is baesd upon the reasoning that when a contro-
versy has come to rest, the litigation should cease." 
at 156 
While in the Jensen case the court recognized an ex-
ception to the general rule that acceptance of an amount 
9 
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pertaining to a separate and distinct claim does not waive 
right to appeal, this case clearly does not come within that 
exception. 
?
 In the present case the judgment and cause of action 
regarding division of property are one and the same. The 
lower court took into account all of the property of the 
parties and considered several factors which it enumerated 
in determining what it thought was an equitable division 
of the property. 
Another exception to the general rule not applicable 
to the present case, was noted by the court in the case of 
Sierra Nevada Mill Company v. Keith O'Brien Company, 
48 Utah 12, 156 Pac. 943 (1916). This is not a situation 
where the amount found in favor of the plaintiff was due 
her in any event. There was and is a controversy over what 
amount, if any, she should be awarded. 
At no time has Defendant in this case admitted that 
the amount awarded Plaintiff was due her in any event. 
There is no stipulation or agreement between the parties 
which agrees on the amount finally awarded or which 
recogni2es said amount as due, except as the court ordered. 
It is clear from the record that Defendant controverted 
Plaintiff's valuation of property in several significant re-
spects. In fact, there is approximately $127,314.00 differ-
ence between Plaintiff's and Defendant's valuation of the 
property to be divided. If the court had followed Defend-
ant's appraisal, its determination of total valuation would 
have been $45,213.00 less than it actually found, and 
would have correspondingly reduced the amount awarded 
to Plaintiff. 
10 
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That such a controversy over valuation and equitable 
division of the property existed in the present case is evi-
dent in the record. The question now before this Court 
regarding property division is not merely whether Plain-
tiff is entitled to a greater or additional sum than awarded 
her by the lower court but also includes the question 
whether equity and fairness demand that Plaintiff's award 
be reduced and whether the lower court abused its discre-
tion in awarding such an amount. 
Further, it is not necessary for Defendant to cross-
appeal from the judgment to invoke the rule. The court in 
the Sierra case faced this argument squarely and held as 
follows: 
"But it is said the defendant has prosecuted no 
cross appeal. That is not essential to the making of 
cross-assignments in defense and in support of, and 
merely to hold, the judgment appealed from. What 
is attacked by the party appealing may, as to him, 
be defended and held by cross-assignments with-
out cross-appeal." at 20-21 
Of particular interest and application to the present case 
is the court's conclusion in the Sierra Nevada case: 
We think the case within the general rule that a 
litigant is not permitted to accept the fruits of a 
judgment and still prosecute an appeal from it. 
Here the plaintiff voluntarily took advantage not 
only of a part of a judgment in its favor, but of the 
whole of it, and accepted payment in full thereof 
and satisfied and discharged the whole of the 
judgment. All of the issues and matters and things 
presented, both by the complaint and counterclaim 
were merged in, and were determined by the judg-
ment. There is no doubt of that. And when the 
11 
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plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payment of the 
judgment, not of a part, but of the whole of it, 
and satisfied and discharged it, not in part, but 
the whole thereof, it likewise satisfied and dis-
charged everything that was merged in, and that 
was determined and adjudicated by the judgment. 
The views herein expressed and the conclusions 
reached are supported by the numerous cases noted 
and cited in McKain v. Mullen, 65 W.Va. 558, 64 
S.E. 829, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1." at 21-22 (Emphasis 
added) 
The fact that Defendant complied with the lower 
court's order and judgment with respect to the division 
of property does not admit that the Plaintiff is so abso-
lutely and unquestionably entitled to the benefits and 
advanages awarded by the judgment that her right to 
accept them and keep them cannot possibly be affected by 
the appeal. Quite to the contrary, Defendant argued in 
the court below and continues to assert before this Court 
that he Plaintiff should not have been awarded the amount 
granted to her by the lower court. Defendant was under 
an obligation to pay the judgment within six months or be 
saddled with an additional $5,000 obligation. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT ALLOWS PLAINTIFF'S 
APPEAL, MODIFICATION OF THE PROP-
ERTY AND ALIMONY AWARD, IF ANY, 
SHOULD RESULT IN A REDUCED AWARD 
WHICH WOULD BE IN HARMONY W I T H 
THE EQUITIES OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE. 
This Court in the case of Sorensen v. Sorensen, 14 
Utah 2d 24, 376 P.2d 547 (1963), held with regard to its 
duty to sustain the trial court's division of property. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Unless there is manifest injustice and inequity or 
a clear abuse of discretion, this court will not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the trial court." at 
26 
Although the lump sum award as ordered by the 
court was paid by Defendant in compliance with the court 
order and voluntarily accepted by Plaintiff as heretofore 
discussed, Defendant has always taken the position that 
the award pertaining to property division was excessive 
and inequitable in light of the attendant circumstances and 
facts so that if it is to be modified, such modification 
should result in a reduced award. 
In suggesting that the award be increased above one-
third of the assets, which plaintiff recognizes as being 
the general rule in divorce matters, Plaintiff relies on the 
cases of Woolley v. Woolley, Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, Tre-
mayne v. Tremayne and Pinion v. Pinion. For example, 
in the case of Woolley v. Woolley, 113 Utah 391, 195 
P.2d 743 (1949), the court granted the divorce to the 
husband and awarded property along the following guide-
lines: 
"While a wife is ordinarily granted a divorce for 
mental cruelty on less provocation than a hus-
band, there may be facts and circumstances appear-
ing to the trial court to present a stronger case for 
the husband." at 393. 
;7; * * * 
"In determining generally what a wife is entitled 
to when a divorce decree has been granted to the 
, husband, we have considered one-third as being a 
fair proportion. This is a relative amount which 
must, of necessity, vary with the facts of the par-
ticular case." at 395 (Emphasis added) 
13 
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In the case of Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 
292 Pac. 214 (1930), the court observed the following: 
"Of course, the rights and equities of both parties 
are to be considered, but whatever doubt there may 
be concerning the matter, it ought to be resolved 
against the guilty party whose fault and wrongs 
and breaches of the marital relation destroyed the 
home and forced or brought about the separation." 
at 163 (Emphasis added) 
In the Lundgreen case there was no discussion of a one-
third division. That case by no means supports Plain-
tiff's argument. The court merely held that in addition to 
the furniture plaintiff had prior to the marriage and her 
personal articles acquired since the marriage, she should 
be awarded one-half of the enhanced value of the house 
after deducting the original purchase price. The record 
was silent as to the present market value of the house, but 
it was purchased in 1943 for $395.00. The case was de-
cided only three years later in 1947. There is considerable 
question as to how much the property would have in-
creased in value over that short period of time and conse-
quently how much would be due the wife as her one-half 
of the enhanced value after deducting the original pur-
chase value. In the Lundgreen case divorce was granted to 
the husband* 
In the cases of Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 
211 P.2d 452 (1949), and Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 
67 P.2d 265 (1937), divorce was awarded to the wife. 
There were special circumstances not present in the instant 
case which were taken into consideration by the court as 
discussed in Plaintiff's brief. 
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By arguing that the purpose of the court in dividing 
property is to permit the parties to reconstruct their lives, 
Plaintiff seems to imply that it is the Court's duty in this 
case to divide the property so that Plainiff, regardless of 
her conduct, may reconstruct her life with her new husband 
in such a way as to maintain indefinitely the same stand-
ard of living she enjoyed with the husband she wronged. 
This argument is certainly contrary to the court's pro-
nouncements in the Woolley case and Dahlberg case, 
supra. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 
2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956). In that case, however, the 
court held that: 
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to pro-
vide a just and equitable adjustment of their eco-
nomic resources so that the parties can reconstruct 
their lives on a happy and useful basis. In doing so 
it is necessary for the court to consider, in addition 
to the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an 
appraisal of all of the attendant factors and cir-
cumstances. . . ." at 83 (Emphasis added) 
In the Wilson case the court also took into consideration 
the "dimmed prospects of a favorable marriage and life 
companionship" for the wife. Obviously, that is not a 
consideration before the Court in this Case. Again, in the 
Wilson case divorce was granted to the wife and the lower 
court based its determination in part on the fact that the 
husband had fallen in love with another woman. 
It is easy to see why the court chose to modify the 
property award in the case of Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah 
63, 262 Pac. 292 (1928), cited by Plaintiff. There the prop-
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erty awarded the wife had a value of $600.00 as com-
pared to the husband's $20,000.00. In other words, the 
wife received 1/3 3rd of the total property of the parties. 
Plaintiff also relies on the case of Ring v. Ring, 29 
Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 (1973), in support of her argu-
ment. In that case the parties, both physicians, had entered 
into a stipulation where it was obvious to the court that 
they had agreed that $800.00 was reasonable and neces-
sary to support the family unit and that the apportion-
ment between alimony and child support had been moti-
vated by tax considerations. The court held that it was 
improper for the lower court to reduce the alimony since 
the parties clearly intended some of the alimony to be used 
for child support. In that case the husband was paying 
$66.66 monthly per child as child support compared to 
$125.00 monthly per child in the present case. Here the 
child support award is such that it may well be used by 
the Plaintiff and her new husband to support the entire 
family unit. 
In the case of Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 
P.2d 928 (1968), cited by Plaintiff, special distinguishing 
factors which may have justified an equal division of 
property included the following: (1) the parties had been 
married 30 years as compared to 11 in the present case; 
(2) the divorce was awarded to the wife; (3) the wife was 
totally disabled at the time of the divorce; (4) the wife 
was not awarded any alimony and she was directed to pay 
her own attorneys fee and cost. 
Plaintiff incorrectly states that the facts in the pres-
ent case indicate that the parties have accumulated $292,-
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101.00 since their marriage. The court found that the total 
value was $210,000.00, which is more than Defendant's 
evidence showed it to be. 
Defendant's appraisal of net worth, including the 
stipulation as to value at trial which form part of the rec-
ord (R. 259-261) (Tr. 147, 148, 209, 212, 403, 405, 406, 
409, 413, 412, 414, 415) totals $164,787.00 after deduct-
ing general debts and obligations of $20,100.00 owing by 
Defendant other than balance owing on properties. 
There is a difference of $127,314.00 between Plaintiff's 
and Defendant's valuations after deducting general debts 
and obligations owing by Defendant other than the bal-
ances owing on properties. 
The principal differences in property valuations be-
tween Plaintiff and Defendant concern the Bentley and 
Sullivan farm, the Syphus farm and the home. Respective 
valuations of the parties' interest in these properties are as 
follows: (R. 259-261; Plaintiff's Brief 7-8) 
Defendant's Plaintiff's 
Property Valuation Valuation 
Bentley and Sullivan farm $ 52,000.00 $104,000.00 
Syphus farm 40,000.00 60,500.00 
Home 65,100.00 74,500.00 
$157,100.00 $239,000.00 
Less Defendant's share of -37,166.00 -38,000.00 
indebtedness in Bentley and 
Sullivan farm 
Less Defendant's share of -34,717.00 -34,717.00 
indebtedness in Syphus farm 
Total $ 85,217.00 $166,283.00 
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In the November 16, 1973, hearing (R. 200,241) 
which was apparently unreported [minute entry reflects 
fact that parties were heard at length regarding property 
settlement, R. 241], the court took judicial notice of the 
recent State Tax Commission adjusted appraisal value 
which was completed in 1973 on these same properties 
showing total values of properties for agricultural use 
and market value. The court noted that the Tax Commis-
sion appraisal values are a matter of public record. They 
reflect the following: [5 times assessed valuation} 
State Tax Commission 
Property 1973 Valuation 
Bentley and Sullivan farm $ 36,210.00 
Syphusfarm 18,468.00 
Home 63,297.00 
Total valuation $117,975.00 
Less Defendant's share of -71,883.00 
indebtedness according to 
Defendant 
Net valuation $ 46,092.00 
With respect to these three properties, Defendant's 
valuation is actually $39,125.00 over that of the 1973 
Tax Commission valuation, while Plaintiff's valuation is 
$121,025.00 over that of the Tax Commission. 
We further call attention to the following admis-
sion made by Plaintiff's witness as to his appraisals and 
valuations: 
(1) That he did not have any comparable sales upon 
which to base his opinion of value with regard to the Bent-
ley and Sullivan farm insofar as other farmlands in the 
immediate area were concerned. (Tr. 188) 
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(2) That it was possible that one of his compar-
ables was purchased by Bloomington at a premium price 
in order for Bloomington to acquire the property it 
needed. (Tr. 191) 
(3) That one of his comparables was property sold 
near the campus of Dixie College which is zoned for 
multiple housing. (Tr. 194) 
(4) That he had appreciated the Syphus property 
by $61,000.00 even though it had been acquired less than 
a year prior to the divorce proceedings (Tr. 193) 
(5) That the reason he appreciated the Syphus farm 
to that degree was that it was within the city limits; how-
ever, he admitted that at the time the Coxes purchased 
the property it is possible that it was already within the 
city limit. (Tr. 196) 
(6) That he was unable to find a home of the size 
and characteristics of the Cox home as a comparable. 
(Tr.201) 
(7) That if the properties were to be sold, after 
title insurance and real estate commissions were deduct-
ed, the profit would be substantially reduced. (Tr. 197, 
205,219) 
Another item concerns the Convertible Bond. In the 
Record at page 260 the Bond is valued at $1,000.00. Ap-
parently there is an error in the transcript of Defendant's 
testimony which mistakenly recorded the amount of 
$8,000.00 rather than $1,000.00. (Tr. 4l4) 
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All matters were ruled upon and concluded at the 
October 5, 1973, hearing except the issue with respect to 
the court's lump sum alimony award to the Plaintiff and 
property distribution between the parties. The court ruled 
with regard to alimony and property division on Novem-
ber 16, 1973, and enumerated the following criteria as 
the basis of its decision: (Mem. Dec. R. 200-201) 
*'There values, in the judgment of the court, must 
be tested in the light of the respective positions of 
the parties and determine therefrom whether or not 
they meet the test of fairness and equal treatment 
under the standards set down by the cases in the 
State of Utah (cases cited} and any particular facts 
and circumstances in this case. To that end, the 
court considered the additional facts and circum-
stances in this particular lawsuit: 
" 1 . Consideration of the assets or equity in real 
property and improvements with large encum-
brances remaining to be paid. 
"2. The Plaintiff testified and reiterated that she 
intended to move away from Washington County, 
Utah, the location of the property and improve-
ments, and to the State of Idaho and to enter into 
a new marriage contract as soon as legally possible. 
" 3 . The court considered a cash value of Plain-
tiff's share in the net worth of the parties as op-
posed to a division in kind. 
"4. The court considered the burden upon the 
Defendant and his earning ability in paying to the 
Plaintiff a present day cash award, supporting the 
children belonging to the parties, and servicing the 
debts on the property. 
{The court hereafter tested the award as made 
against the compilation of net assets as determined 
by the Plaintiff and Defendant respectively and 
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thereby concluded that the award made by the court 
was comparable.}" (Mem. Dec. R. 203) (Emphasis 
added) 
The Defendant testified at trial that the Bentley-
Sullivan farm contained about 43 acres when purchased 
and that approximately three acres were washed down the 
river by flood. He also testified that only about 20 to 21 
acres of the farm could be irregated and that almost all of 
the property was wasteland. (Tr. 407) 
The Court also considered the fact that Defendant's 
practice has been substantially curtailed with the recent 
location of several new orthodontists in the area. (R. 417-
418) When the parties first moved to St. George, there 
were no other orthodontists practicing between Provo 
and Las Vegas. (R. 417) 
Defendant's annual after-tax income during the three 
years prior to the divorce was $15,100.00. (Exhibits D-3, 
D-4, D-5; R. 353-359) Out of that income he is now re-
quired to make payments toward considerable debts and 
obligations, as well as $500.00 a month payments for 
child support. 
It is Defendant's position that on the basis of the 
value of the property as submitted by Defendant and the 
1973 Utah State Tax Commission valuation, the lower 
court should have awarded Plaintiff less property settle-
and/or less support money for the children. Moreover, in 
other jurisdictions, courts have awarded the innocent 
spouse more than the normal share in cases of extreme 
mental cruelty or adultery. Dallman v. Dallman, 164 
Cal.2d 815, 331 P.2d 245 (1958). 
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In view of the conduct of the Plaintiff in this case, 
it seems grossly unfair for the court to award her in ex-
cess of one-third of the property and to leave the inno-
cent spouse under an extreme financial burden. By so 
doing, the court appears to reward and condone such mis-
conduct. •••:*••••..-;.- u\/:.-X- ; W . ' 0 ;•*•:.•• 
In making its determination of property value and 
subsequent award, the court below should have given 
greater weight and consideration to the following: 
(1) The admissions of Plaintiff's witness which 
were evidence of his inflated appraisals. 
(2) The State Tax Commission appraisal of which 
the court took judicial notice and which was considerably 
less than appraisals of both parties. 
(3) The wrongs and breaches of the marital relation 
committed by Plaintiff which destroyed the home and 
forced or brought about the separation. 
(4) The hardship to Defendant in paying a lump 
sum payment in addition to being left with responsibility 
of servicing the debts on the properties and child support. 
POINT III 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR 
THE TRIAL COURT TO REVERSE ITS ORIG-
INAL CUSTODY ORDER WITHOUT A SPE-
CIFIC FINDING THAT THE REVERSAL WAS 
JUSTIFIED BY A CHANGE OF CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
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In addition to the matters discussed by Defendants 
in his initial brief, we submit there was no basis for the 
court reversing its initial order as to custody of the minor 
children. 
The court made specific findings in its ruling on 
February 9, 1973, at which time it awarded the divorce to 
Defendant, as well as custody of the four minor children. 
(R. 113-14) The subsequent change of custody without 
a showing of change of circumstances was clearly an abuse 
of discretion. The court specifically found on the proof 
supported by the evidence presented that the Plaintiff had 
exercised poor judgment in having Mr. Hamilton associ-
ated as close as he was. The court further expressed con-
cern as to the propriety and judgment of some of the actions 
that the court heard testimony on concerning Mr. Hamil-
ton and the position he had placed the Plaintiff in. The 
court also expressed concern about the fact that the Plain-
tiff planned to take the children from Washington County 
in the immediate future to Boise, Idaho, and to intro-
duce them into a new home and that she planned to marry 
this Mr. Hamilton. 
After finding it in the best interest of the children to 
award custody to their father upon the above stated con-
siderations, it was encumbent upon the court to require 
a showing of change of circumstances which would justify 
a change of custody before that change was made. 
This Court held in the case of Crofts v. Crofts, 21 
Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968), as follows: 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"{T}he finality of a judgment must be respected 
in order to insure the rights of parties. Section 
30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
« <# # * Such subsequent changes or new 
orders may be made by the court with respect 
to the disposal of the children or the distribution 
of property as shall be reasonable and proper.' 
"This, however, requires some good cause based 
upon a change of circumstances for modifying the 
decree and cannot be done by interpreting the 
language thereof." at 334-335. 
Counsel for Plaintiff specifically stated to the court 
at the October hearing when order as to custdy was re-
versed that Plaintiff's testimony would show that her 
circumstances had not changed with regard to her inten-
tion to move. (Tr. 18) No further representation as to 
change of circumstances was made by Plaintiff's counsel 
and no showing of change of circumstances was required 
by the court. Counsel for Defendant, on the other hand, 
took the following position: 
"Now, it is our position, your Honor, that there is 
not one scintilla of evidence in the record or be-
fore this court to show any change of circumstance, 
which I am sure was anticipated and toward which 
the court directed the character of its judgment 
back in February of this year. . . . I think the 
record is clear and replete with evidence which 
shows that the total best interest of those chil-
dren is to remain with their father and if at some 
time in the future the mother establishes a home 
. some place where she can show at that time a home 
life and home situation which is condusive to the 
best interest of the children, she, as in all cases of 
this kind, has the right to petition the court for a 
modification of he decree. 
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SUMMARY 
We respectfully submit that if the judgment of the 
lower court regarding property division, alimony and 
child support is modified, such modification should result 
in a reduced award. 
The children should be returned to the custody of 
their father consistent with the original order of the trial 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Randall L. Romrell 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD 
AND GOTTFREDSON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
V. Pershing Nelson 
ALDRICH AND NELSON 
Fidelity Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Defendant-Cross 
Appellant 
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